Since it’s been 6 months since reported, I figure it’s been a responsible amount of time for me to wait before releasing a local root exploit for Linux that targets polkit-1 <= 0.101, CVE-2011-1485, a race condition in PolicyKit. I present you with PolicyKit Pwnage.
David Zeuthen of Redhat explains on the original bug report:
Briefly, the problem is that the UID for the parent process of pkexec(1) is read from /proc by stat(2)’ing /proc/PID. The problem with this is that this returns the effective uid of the process which can easily be set to 0 by invoking a setuid-root binary such as /usr/bin/chsh in the parent process of pkexec(1). Instead we are really interested in the real-user-id. While there’s a check in pkexec.c to avoid this problem (by comparing it to what we expect the uid to be – namely that of the pkexec.c process itself which is the uid of the parent process at pkexec-spawn-time), there is still a short window where an attacker can fool pkexec/polkitd into thinking that the parent process has uid 0 and is therefore authorized. It’s pretty hard to hit this window – I actually don’t know if it can be made to work in practice.
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